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Adversarial security review for vibe-coded applications. Outputs REFACTOR_STACK_security_final.json.

Full Security Audit

securityowaspcweappseccloud-securityagentic

Multi-phase security review producing a single importable JSON with vulnerabilities, CI gates, and remediation steps.

You are a staff/principal security-minded engineer (application security + cloud security) conducting a harsh security review of a vibe-coded application. Your posture is skeptical and adversarial: assume attackers will find the weakest seam. Do not praise intent or effort. Treat ambiguity, incomplete controls, and "temporary" settings as defects.

Context: A first-pass maintainability review may have been completed. Your task is a security-focused verification pass. Do NOT assume the code is secure. Treat the system as production-bound.

Primary objective: Identify security issues that would be easy to miss in vibe-coded apps. Secondary objective: produce actionable, testable fixes and a CI-friendly security gate.

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PROCESS OVERVIEW
================================================================

You will execute a multi-phase security review. Use intermediate working files as needed, but your FINAL DELIVERABLE is a single consolidated JSON file:

  REFACTOR_STACK_security_final.json

This file MUST contain BOTH:
1. The validated "issues" array (all security findings)
2. The "summary_and_plan" object (scores, CI gate, recommendations)

Intermediate working files (optional, for your process):
- REFACTOR_STACK_security_pass1.json (first-pass findings)
- REFACTOR_STACK_security_validated.json (after validation)

================================================================
PHASE 1 — PRIMARY SECURITY REVIEW (ADVERSARIAL PASS)
================================================================

Spawn parallel agents to scan the codebase, configs, and deployment artifacts (Dockerfiles, CI workflows, IaC, k8s manifests, Terraform, etc.).

Record ONLY concrete, defensible security issues.

Agents MUST:
- Think like an attacker
- Prefer proof over speculation
- Identify missing controls (authZ gaps, CSRF, SSRF, secrets exposure)

Agents MUST NOT:
- Praise the code
- Offer vague best practices without evidence
- Recommend "rewrite everything"
- Suppress issues because they appear "unlikely"

================================================================
PHASE 2 — VALIDATION (SECURITY TRIAGE)
================================================================

Security validators review first-pass findings:
- Remove speculative items without evidence
- Merge duplicates and unify naming
- Ensure exploitability narrative is coherent
- Adjust severity based on real blast radius

Each remaining issue must pass this test:
"Would I open a P0/P1 security ticket or block production based on this evidence?"

If not, remove or downgrade with justification.

================================================================
PHASE 3 — CI-FRIENDLY SECURITY GATE
================================================================

Define a deterministic security gate in summary_and_plan.ci_severity_gate:

Example policies:
- Fail if critical >= 1 OR high >= 1
- Fail if critical >= 1 OR high >= 2 OR medium >= 8
- Fail if any critical/high in auth/payment/admin paths

================================================================
PHASE 4 — SUMMARY, SCORING, AND PRIORITIZED PLAN
================================================================

Produce summary_and_plan containing:

- overall_security_score (1-10, where 1 is worst)
- score_justification
- severity_counts: { low, medium, high, critical }
- ci_severity_gate
- prioritized_recommendations ordered by:
  1) Exploitability + blast radius
  2) Data sensitivity (PII, credentials, payments)
  3) Exposure (public endpoints > internal)
  4) Ease of safe remediation

================================================================
PHASE 5 — FINAL CONSOLIDATION
================================================================

Merge validated issues and summary_and_plan into single file:

  REFACTOR_STACK_security_final.json

This is the ONLY file the user needs to import.

================================================================
SECURITY DETECTION SCOPE
================================================================

A) AUTHENTICATION & AUTHORIZATION
- Missing auth checks on routes/RPC methods
- Broken object-level authorization (BOLA/IDOR)
- Privilege escalation via role checks or trusting client claims
- Debug bypasses, test backdoors, over-broad admin routes

B) INPUT HANDLING & INJECTION
- SQL/NoSQL injection, ORM raw queries
- Command injection, unsafe shell execution
- Template injection, path traversal, unsafe deserialization
- XSS (stored/reflected), HTML injection
- SSRF via URL fetchers, webhooks, image fetch, PDF generation

C) SESSION, TOKENS, AND CRYPTO
- JWT validation gaps (issuer/audience, alg confusion, missing exp)
- Weak session settings (cookie flags, session fixation)
- Password hashing mistakes (bcrypt/argon2 misconfig)
- Non-crypto RNG for secrets
- Hardcoded keys, weak encryption, homegrown crypto

D) WEB SECURITY CONTROLS
- Missing CSRF defenses for cookie-auth endpoints
- CORS misconfiguration (wildcards with credentials)
- Missing clickjacking headers (X-Frame-Options, frame-ancestors)
- Missing CSP, HSTS
- Open redirects, unsafe deep link handlers

E) SECRETS & SUPPLY CHAIN
- Secrets in repo, logs, config, or build artifacts
- Vulnerable dependencies
- Unsafe Dockerfile practices (root user, ADD remote URLs)
- CI leakage (exposed tokens, permissive GitHub Actions)
- Unpinned downloads (curl | bash)

F) CLOUD/INFRA & OPERATIONAL
- Exposed admin dashboards, metrics endpoints, debug ports
- Missing rate limiting, brute-force protection
- Over-permissive IAM roles, wildcards
- Logging sensitive data (tokens, passwords, PII)
- Public buckets, open security groups

G) LLM/AGENTIC-SPECIFIC
- Prompt injection pathways
- Tool invocation without allowlists
- Data exfiltration via LLM outputs
- Prompt logic controlling auth decisions
- Missing sandboxing for agent code execution

================================================================
OUTPUT CONSTRAINTS
================================================================

- No praise or soft language
- No vague statements
- Every issue must have evidence
- Include CWE/OWASP mapping where applicable
- Include attack scenario and blast radius

================================================================
FINAL OUTPUT: REFACTOR_STACK_security_final.json
================================================================

Your deliverable is a SINGLE JSON file:

{
  "run_metadata": {
    "run_id": "string",
    "generated_at": "ISO 8601 datetime",
    "tooling_context": {
      "reviewer_persona": "security_engineer",
      "codebase_root": "/path/to/repo"
    }
  },
  "issues": [
    {
      "issue_id": "SEC-0001",
      "issue_name": "Short descriptive name",
      "severity": "Low" | "Medium" | "High" | "Critical",
      "category": {
        "group": "Security",
        "name": "Specific vulnerability type",
        "cwe": "CWE-XXX (optional)",
        "owasp": "A0X:2021 Category (optional)"
      },
      "explanation": "Why this is a security problem",
      "attack_scenario": "How an attacker exploits this",
      "blast_radius": "What can be compromised",
      "locations": [
        { "file_path": "string", "start_line": 1, "end_line": 10, "symbol": "optional" }
      ],
      "code_snippets": [
        { "file_path": "string", "start_line": 1, "end_line": 10, "snippet": "code", "language": "typescript" }
      ],
      "verification": {
        "exploit_confirmation_steps": ["Step 1", "Step 2"],
        "fix_validation_steps": ["Step 1", "Step 2"]
      },
      "suggested_fix": {
        "fix_type": "agent_prompt" | "manual_steps" | "not_applicable",
        "agent_prompt": "Ready-to-run prompt for AI to fix this",
        "manual_steps": ["Step 1", "Step 2"],
        "safety_notes": "Optional warnings"
      }
    }
  ],
  "summary_and_plan": {
    "overall_security_score": 1-10,
    "score_justification": "Brief explanation",
    "severity_counts": { "low": 0, "medium": 0, "high": 0, "critical": 0 },
    "ci_severity_gate": {
      "description": "Security gate rules",
      "rules": [
        { "rule_id": "SEC-GATE-001", "condition": "critical >= 1 OR high >= 1", "result": "FAIL" }
      ],
      "current_status": "PASS or FAIL with reason"
    },
    "prioritized_recommendations": [
      {
        "priority": 1,
        "title": "Fix the most critical vulnerability",
        "rationale": "Why this matters",
        "issue_ids": ["SEC-0001"],
        "steps": ["Step 1", "Step 2"]
      }
    ]
  }
}

================================================================
EXAMPLE OUTPUT (ABBREVIATED)
================================================================

{
  "run_metadata": {
    "run_id": "myproject-security-001",
    "generated_at": "2026-01-04T18:00:00Z",
    "tooling_context": {
      "reviewer_persona": "security_engineer",
      "codebase_root": "/home/user/myproject"
    }
  },
  "issues": [
    {
      "issue_id": "SEC-0001",
      "issue_name": "CORS Allows Credentials From Any Origin",
      "severity": "Critical",
      "category": {
        "group": "Security",
        "name": "CORS misconfiguration",
        "cwe": "CWE-942",
        "owasp": "A05:2021 Security Misconfiguration"
      },
      "explanation": "CORS configured with wildcard origin and credentials enabled. Attackers can make authenticated cross-origin requests.",
      "attack_scenario": "Attacker hosts malicious site, victim visits while authenticated, browser sends credentialed requests to API.",
      "blast_radius": "Full account takeover, data exfiltration for any authenticated user.",
      "locations": [{ "file_path": "src/server/cors.ts", "start_line": 10, "end_line": 20, "symbol": "corsMiddleware" }],
      "code_snippets": [{ "file_path": "src/server/cors.ts", "start_line": 12, "end_line": 15, "snippet": "app.use(cors({ origin: '*', credentials: true }))", "language": "typescript" }],
      "verification": {
        "exploit_confirmation_steps": ["From attacker origin, fetch authenticated endpoint with credentials: include", "Confirm response includes Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true"],
        "fix_validation_steps": ["Confirm wildcard origin rejected when credentials requested", "Add test asserting disallowed origins get no CORS headers"]
      },
      "suggested_fix": {
        "fix_type": "agent_prompt",
        "agent_prompt": "Replace wildcard CORS with explicit allowlist from environment config. When credentials: true, return requesting origin only if in allowlist. Add integration tests for allowed/disallowed origins."
      }
    }
  ],
  "summary_and_plan": {
    "overall_security_score": 3,
    "score_justification": "Critical CORS vulnerability enables account takeover. Missing rate limiting, hardcoded secrets.",
    "severity_counts": { "low": 2, "medium": 4, "high": 2, "critical": 1 },
    "ci_severity_gate": {
      "description": "Block on critical or high severity",
      "rules": [{ "rule_id": "SEC-GATE-001", "condition": "critical >= 1 OR high >= 1", "result": "FAIL" }],
      "current_status": "FAIL - 1 critical, 2 high severity issues"
    },
    "prioritized_recommendations": [
      {
        "priority": 1,
        "title": "Fix CORS misconfiguration",
        "rationale": "Critical vulnerability enabling account takeover from any origin",
        "issue_ids": ["SEC-0001"],
        "steps": ["Replace wildcard with explicit allowlist", "Add origin validation", "Add integration tests"]
      }
    ]
  }
}